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1.  Introduction
In both developed and developing countries, there has been a 
contemporary debate on the nature and merits of decentralization. 
The collapse of communism and the “crisis” of the welfare state have 
rekindled serious thinking about the relationship between governance 
and the appropriate level of devolution of power away from the 
central state to lower levels of administrative and political authority. 
Moreover, the growing demand for public services and infrastructure 
in Third World countries has brought increasing calls for decentraliza-
tion to develop taylor-made policies in congruence with varying na-
tional needs (Rondinelli, McCullough and Johnson, 1989). However, 
and despite the fact that decentralization issues have been on the 
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political front-burner in the last two decades, no single paradigm or 
theoretical model informs the study and practice of decentralization 
policies across nations.
On a very general level, decentralization is the transfer of re-
sponsibilities and revenue from national government to subnational 
offices (Rondinelli, 1981). This definition suggests that power is being 
given away through a series of measures and steps meant to eliminate 
overload at the central level, in which case decentralization denotes 
a process rather than a final or pre-set goal. Despite most studies of 
decentralization accept a process-oriented perspective, there is no 
overarching agreement about its goals. This is basically due to the fact 
that students of decentralization oftentimes confound political and 
fiscal decentralization. In Europe, there has been a trend to encapsu-
late types of decentralization under the notion of regionalism and 
regionalization. Albeit useful to pin down the determinants of re-
gional policy in a era of global political and economic change (i.e. 
Keating and Loughlin, 1997; Le Gales and Lequesne, 1998), this body 
of research uses indicators of political and fiscal decentralization in-
terchangeably, diminishing their empirical usefulness. Also, frequent 
regime changes and a strong “centralist tradition” (Veliz, 1980) have 
been long-standing factors inflating the political nature of decen-
tralization in Latin America and downplaying the significance of fiscal 
power relations. Borrowing from Bird (1993: 208), widely recognized 
as a leading student of fiscal decentralization, “decentralization seems 
often to mean whatever the person using the term wants it to mean”.
Adding to this conceptual muddle is the widespread misleading 
understanding of federalism as simply a degree of decentralization 
(but, Osaghae, 1990). Even worse, the institutional structure of fed-
eralism, despite its mandatory and constitutionally-guaranteed levels 
of decentralization, may at times have no distinctive effects on sub-
national public finances and intergovernmental fiscal relations. In 
order to unravel this putative theoretical riddle, this article draws on 
institutional analysis and new insights from interest group theory to 
shed light on the mechanism linking the politico-institutional deter-
mination of fiscal decentralization.
Specifically, it first assesses said dilemma in terms of the repre-
sentation of territorial interests in the Argentina and Spanish Senates 
to show how heir respective levels of overrepresentation and policy 144
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authority shape coalition building in distributive politics. It confronts 
Tsebelis and Money (1997: 33)’s argument that “in most federal systems 
the legitimacy of upper houses remains unquestioned and their pow-
er unconstrained”. While there is a large kernel of truth in this claim, 
this section will add some nuances to their statement by illustrating 
variation in the extent to which the Argentine and Spanish Senates 
represent subnational interests and in their ability to provide a forum 
for the different territorial units to debate policies. In the process of 
showing the formal structural differences of said bodies, attention is 
focused on the basis of their composition, how chosen, and their 
policy scope. These questions about institutional design do not only 
reflect the formal structure but they also illustrate why political deci-
sion-making follows characteristic patterns in different polities. As 
historical institutionalist approaches contend, “a nation’s electoral 
system and constitutional structure provide the institutional ‘rules of 
the game’ in which subsequent political battles are fought (Thelen 
and Steinmo, 1992: 22). Subsequent to comparing these cases, we will 
show that the Argentine Senate exercises more influence than its 
Spanish counterpart, but the powerlessness and ostensible policy ir-
relevance of the latter rendered a “window of opportunity” for the 
articulation of subnational interests through informal territorial in-
stitutions. This point is analyzed more systematically in addressing the 
issue of institutional interest representation. The ultimate puzzle ad-
dressed in this section, then, is why the comparative strengths of the 
Argentine Senate amounted to a “double-edged sword” whereby, on 
the one hand, provincial-level actors have numerous opportunities to 
exert influence on the fate of intergovernmental transfers and, on 
the other, it locks in the existing politicization of decentralization 
policies and make the pursuit of fiscal accountability harder. Put dif-
ferently, the weaknesses of the Spanish Senate amounted to an insti-
tutional facilitator that helped to create alternative fora for fiscal 
intergovernmental coordination and thus to advance the cause of 
fiscal federalism in Spain.
Second, this article explores the conditions leading to bilateral 
and multilateral intergovernmental bargaining which ultimately shape 
the outcomes of fiscal decentralization. It draws on Ellen Immergut 
(1992)’s concept of “veto points” to highlight why the mere existence 
of strong federal representative institutions of territorial interests 
does not necessarily mean that they are effective in advancing the 
horizontal division of powers between the central and regional gov-145
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ernments. It shows that a mighty senate may fall short of becoming 
an actual arena of intergovernmental exchanges, when subnational 
units are disproportionately overrepresented. Put in “veto points” 
terms, when a highly institutionalized political structure of territorial 
representation such as the Argentine Senate is adjacent to exceed-
ingly malapportioned electoral rules, it will perpetuate existing pathol-
ogies in distributive policy. At this juncture, some subnational units 
(i.e. peripheral, transfer-dependent) are motivated to preserve the 
status quo and others (i.e. metropolitan, more fiscally-proficient) pre-
fer to move away from it. Because the former group of provinces 
affords the national government a legislative majority at a “conven-
ient” price, distributive policy (i.e. fiscal decentralization) bears out 
cooptative and patronage-ridden undertones. Of necessity, the latter 
group of provinces seeks to level out their share and press their case 
with national authorities. The resulting outcome is bilateral fiscal 
agreements and incomplete decentralization. By the same token, this 
study claims that feeble territorial representation at the senate level 
does not inevitably thwart subnational assertiveness. In Spain, region-
alist-party dominance in fiscally-competent autonomous communities 
(henceforth, AC), their increasing influence in the national parliament, 
and their concomitant acceptance in emerging joint policy-making 
mechanisms inhibited backward regions’ attempts to preserve the 
status quo (i.e. revenue centralization). Albeit not entirely keen yet 
“institutionally” unable to block the moves of richer regions, the lat-
ter follow suit. The resulting outcome is increasing multilateral fiscal 
collaboration and expanding decentralization. These arguments are 
illustrated through the narrative of two contrasting experiences: The 
Argentine Fiscal Federal Pacts and the Spanish Council for Fiscal and 
Financing Policy of the AC.
2.  The Territorial Role of Political Institutions: 
Representation and Policy scope of the senate
Unlike lower houses,1 which are elected directly by a nation’s 
citizens, with equal weight given to each eligible voter, representation 
in the senate varies in two main dimensions: who is represented (i.e. 
1. We will use the notions of lower house, lower chamber, and chamber of deputies in-
terchangeably.146
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constituent groups) and how they are represented (i.e. method of 
selection). On the first dimension, it is normal to compose the senate 
in some way that is different from the way in which the low house is 
chosen (Patterson and Mughan, 1999: 10-12). With the exceptions of 
Italy and Japan, where both houses are chosen on an equal basis, some 
differentiation between popular and territorial representation exists. 
The Argentine and Spanish Senates represent geographical constitu-
ent unit, which do not exclusively draw on population levels. How-
ever, while provinces are the relevant political unit in Argentina, the 
connection between territory and senate representation in Spain is 
less clear-cut. Based on a hybrid arrangement that somewhat resem-
bles the German system, representation in the senate is primarily on 
the basis of sub-regional provinces (electoral unit), which each have 
equal representation. These provincial representatives amount to 208 
out of a total of 256 senators. The remaining seats are occupied by 
AC representatives, with seats distributed on a population-based for-
mula similar to that used in Germany and Austria (Flores Juberías, 
1999). Secondly, leaving aside those who are ex-officio members of a 
senate,2 the basic choice is between election and appointment. The 
former method is the most frequently employed, particularly in fed-
eral systems like the United States, Australia, Switzerland and others. 
However, in some cases, indirect representation precedes the adoption 
of direct election. While direct elections for the US Senate were in-
troduced in 1913, Argentina has only adopted direct election of sen-
ators after the Constitutional Reform in 1994. In Spain, like the pre-
1994 period in Argentina, senators representing AC are designated 
by the Autonomous Parliaments, thus indirectly elected.
The above-mentioned differences between the Argentine and 
Spanish Senates notwithstanding, Lijphart (1999: 207; 211) claims that 
both countries have an incongruent bicameral structure because their 
respective houses are formally elected by different methods and rep-
resent different constituent units. Note that the degree of incongru-
ence is positively associated with senate strength because the latter’s 
capacity of contestation is bolstered when its composition does not 
mimic the composition of the other house. Nevertheless, it is more 
appropriate to talk about levels of congruence rather about its pres-
2. Apart from lifetime appointments in the British House of Lords, the Italian Senate in-
cludes a nominal number of Prime Ministerial appointees (Tsebelis and Money. 1997: 47).147
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ence or absence. Lijphart’s approach to congruence as a categorical 
trait masks important differences among cases. While it is something 
of a conventional wisdom in the literature about Argentine political 
institutions that a fully incongruent senate is causally related to this 
country’s strong bicameral structure (Molinelli, Palanza and Sin, 1999: 
55-58), the same cannot be said of Spain, where almost 82 percent of 
the senators are elected on the same territorial basis as the members 
of the national parliament. What is more, and suggesting that the 
characterization of Spanish bicameralism as incongruent is question-
able, while senatorial elections in Argentina are staggered, the vast 
majority of Spanish Senators are elected the same day as the Diputa-
dos in the lower house. As a result, the partisan composition of the 
Senate is unrepresentative of that of AC governments, as its electoral 
system encourages voters to cast a ballot for the same party repeat-
edly.3 In brief, Argentine senators are better equipped to represent 
subnational interests than their Spanish counterparts.
Before we proceed to examine the level of policy authority of 
the senate in both countries, what difference does bicameralism make 
with respect to fiscal policy performance? Or, put differently, does the 
fact that revenue-sharing bills are dealt with, or alternatively blocked, 
at the senate level make any difference in terms of policy outputs? 
Extant research suggests that bicameralism induces greater fiscal def-
icits and, more indirectly, precludes economic adjustment. According 
to Heller (1997), who surveyed 17 unicameral and bicameral democra-
cies from 1965 to 1990, “government budget deficits are higher when 
policy conflict is built into the budget process, specifically in the form 
of a bilateral veto game between legislative chambers”. In a similar 
fashion, Remmer and Wibbels (2000) observe that subnational interests 
in Argentina are in a pivotal position to offer resistance to national 
policies of economic adjustment because provinces can make adroit 
use of territorial representational advantages. However, there is an 
alternative body of scholarship that explores the possibility of a pos-
itive effect of bicameralism on public finances. While this literature is 
somewhat eclectic in its analytical focus, its common thread is that 
senatorial intervention in the policy-making process is advantageous 
insofar as it offers an additional arena of deliberation and fine-tuning 
3. In this regard, there is an ongoing tension between the miniscule role played by region-
alist parties in Senate and their leading role in regional governments (Gunther, Montero 
and Botella, 2004: 121). 148
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of public policies. For instance, Vatter (in Nolte, 2002: 18) shows that 
bicameralism strengthens fiscal decentralization and precludes “over-
fishing” at the subnational level. Likewise, Lane and Ersson (in Nolte, 
2002: 18) claim that “when there is a symmetrically composed two-
chamber assembly, then public expenditures tend to be lower and 
surpluses higher”. So, while the jury is still out to determine the effect 
of bicameralism on fiscal outputs, it becomes apparent that senates 
“matter” in the politics of fiscal federalism.
Another aspect relates to the capacity of the senate to have a 
decisive bearing on fiscal policies or, put differently, its standing as a 
“veto player” body. In formulating one of the most seminal analytical 
frameworks of rational choice theory, Tsebelis (1995: 293) defines veto 
players as “an individual or collective actor whose agreement is re-
quired for a policy decision”. Veto players can be grouped into two 
major different categories: “partisan” veto players, namely the po-
litical parties in the legislature and “institutional” veto players, which 
include the executive, both legislative houses, and to some extent, 
the courts, constitutionally required super majorities and referendums. 
In a nutshell, veto player perspective assesses a problem of collective 
action, one in which selective incentives must be dispensed in order 
to guarantee political support for effective governance. More spe-
cifically, this approach seeks to pinpoint the conditions for coopting 
supporters in the policy process.
So, to what extent are the Argentine and Spanish Senates “veto 
players”? To respond this question, we will focus on their respective 
(exclusive) policy competences and how disagreements between both 
houses are resolved in each country. Argentina in theory follows the 
US constitutional formula of bicameral “symmetry of policy scope” 
(Stepan, 2001: 345). While symmetry denotes that both houses are 
equally important and that the consent of both houses is necessary 
for most important decisions4, there are some policy areas in which 
they have greater prerogatives. The lower house has greater author-
ity in originating money bills, general tax laws, troop recruitment and 
others. The senate, on the other hand, is in charge of approving pres-
4. However, when disagreement between houses persists, the Argentine Congress resorts 
to the navette system to resolve it. If after several rounds of intercameral exchanges of 
bill proposals discrepancies cannot be bridged, the originating house has the upper hand 
and makes the final decision (Tsebelis and Money, 1997: 54-55).149
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idential nominees and advisors, authorize the president to declare a 
coup d’état in case of foreign military attack and appoint judges that 
assess federal expenditures. More crucially from the perspective our 
study, all revenue-sharing bills (including federal transfers) must orig-
inate in the senate. Additional senatorial prerogatives can be cited at 
length, but the encapsulation of fiscal decentralization issues at the 
Senate level suffice to highlight why this house is the institutional 
point of reference to uncover the politicization of these issues. This 
perception of the policy-making scope of the Senate is confirmed by 
a recent cross-national survey of bicameralism in nine Latin American 
countries, concluding that Argentina ranks as the most symmetrical 
bicameral system in the region and thus “the senate is constitution-
ally equipped to act as an actual ‘veto player’ insofar as it can delay 
lower house legislation at ease and eventually generate legislative 
paralysis” (Llanos, 2002: 21).
We are not the first to point out that the Spanish Senate lacks 
significant policy-making powers.5 The Spanish constitution allows 
autonomic parliaments to propose bills to the national assembly. These 
bills may be introduced by representatives of the former bodies but, 
paradoxically, the alleged chamber of territorial representation is by-
passed and plays no major role. Beyond scrutiny functions such con-
vening special investigative commissions or forcing ministers to answer 
questions and pale legislative roles like the responding to bills already 
discussed and passed the parliament, “the senate has absolutely no 
voice in the selection and permanence in office of the executive” 
(Flores Juberías, 1999: 287). More crucially, its footing in the territo-
rial policy domain is quite limited as well. While the authorization of 
cooperation agreements between the ACs appears to be an issue that 
falls within the senate’s jurisdiction, its authority is limited to postpon-
ing the moment that the lower house is allowed to impose its will on 
the senate in this issue. In an attempt to revamp the role of the senate 
as a more territorial chamber, the Comisión General de las Comuni-
dades Autónomas, General Committee for the Autonomous Commu-
nities, was established in 1994. Despite some positive moves such as 
opening its doors to representatives of AC governments and debating 
territorial issues, Aja (1999: 146) argues that this committee experi-
5. See, for instance, Aja (1999), Beramendi and Máiz (2004), Börzel (2002), Gunther, Mon-
tero and Botella (2004), Solozábal (1996).150
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ences the same structural limitations the senate does, amounting to 
a “small senate inside the senate”.
How does the Spanish Senate compare with its Argentine coun-
terpart in terms of its “veto player” status? While based on the afore-
mentioned policy-making powers it does not appear that the Spanish 
Senate is a “veto player” in its own right until far-reaching institutio-
nal reforms take place,6 Stepan (2004: 328-329) claims that the sen-
ate can potentially become a “veto player” on the basis of the Ar  ticle 
155 of Spanish Constitution. This article establishes that the senate 
can adopt measures to force regional governments to fulfill their legal/
constitutional obligations and prevent them from acting against the 
“general interest” of Spain. However, and citing Juan Linz’s authorita-
tive opinion on Spanish politics, Stepan acknowledges that said article 
has never been applied because it could only become effective through 
a federal deposition of the government and military occupation of a 
recalcitrant AC, leading to an eventual subnational regime breakdown. 
Hence, we are more inclined to downplay the actual “veto player” 
potential of the Senate of Spain.
2.1. “When Effects Become Causes”: Malapportionment7 and 
Its Consequences
In federal systems, where territorial representation is juxtaposed 
to population representation, unequal representation of subnational 
units is commonplace (Lijphart, 1984). Partly as a “built-in” feature of 
federalism aimed at redressing economic and demographic vulnerabil-
ity of smaller jurisdictions, these are deliberately (i.e. constitutionally) 
overrepresented in the Senate.8 Consequently, this should hold as well 
6. On the difficulties to reform the Spanish Senate, see Roller (2002).
7. While malapportionment is more commonly used at the micro level (i.e. the votes of 
some citizens weigh more than the votes of other citizens), overrepresentation is employed 
to denote institutional apportionment. Some scholars prefer the latter term, because the 
term malapportionment carries a more distinctive negative connotation (Gibson, Calvo 
and Falletti, 1998: 2). We, however, will use both terms interchangeably.
8. Despite that senates are overly more over-represented, lower chambers are sometimes 
subject to malapportionment. Both unitary Colombia and New Zealand, which reserve 
seats for indigenous people on a non-geographic basis, and federal India, where desig-
nated casts districts are over-represented, share a high level of lower house malapportion-
ment (Samuels and Snyder, 2001: 658). 151
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for the Argentine and Spanish upper chambers. Subsequent to illus-
trating the extent of malapportionment in these cases, we will elabo-
rate analytically why institutional overrepresentation is inextricably 
linked with distributive policy outputs. While malapportionment in 
the Spanish Senate is not entirely inconsequential, we will argue that, 
given its egregious nature and based on the significant policy-making 
powers of the senate, legislative overrepresentation in Argentina 
stands out as a decisive independent variable to explain the paucity 
of fiscal decentralization reforms.
How pervasive is Senate malpportionment in Argentina and 
Spain? According to the Stepan/Swenden Federal Databank, which 
uses the Gini Index of Inequality to measure malapportionment,9 Ar-
gentina has the world’s highest level of senate overrepresentation.
Table 1. senate overrepresentation (stepan/swenden data)
Gini Index of Inequality Percentage of Seats of Best
Represented Decile
Belgium .015 Belgium 10.8
Austria .05 Austria 11.9
India .10 India 15.4
Spain .31 Spain 23.7
Germany .32 Germany 24.0
Canada .34 Australia 28.7
Australia .36 Canada 33.4
Russia .43 Russia 35.0
Switzerland .45 Switzerland 38.4
USA .49 USA 39.7
Brazil .52 Brazil 41.3
Argentina .61 Argentina 44.8
MEAN .33 MEAN 28.3
Source: Stepan (1997) and own calculations. Higher values denote higher malapportionment.
Table 1, which uses the afore-mentioned databank, also shows 
how Argentina and Spain fare compared to other ten federal systems. 
9. For a detailed explanation of the calculation of this index, see Stepan (2001: 344).152
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It indicates that Argentina’s figures for the Gini Index and percent-
age of seats for best represented decile nearly double those of Spain. 
While Spain has relatively high level of senate overrepresentation 
compared to similar multinational federations like Belgium and India, 
its figures are much lower than those for ethnically-diverse Canada 
and Switzerland. Note that Spain ranks below the mean in both 
measures. To corroborate whether these results are a function of the 
dataset used for Table 1, we will triangulate them with data from 
Samuels and Snyder’s study of comparative malapportionment.10 
Table 2 shows the world’s twenty most over-represented senates and, 
confirming the previous analysis, Argentina ranks first. Spain, on the 
other hand, appears to show a somewhat higher level of malappor-
tionment because it is slightly above the mean value yet short of 
modifying the pattern of Table 1, as it only outdoes Germany but by 
a small margin.
Table 2. senate overrepresentation (samuels/snyder data)
MALUC Federal MALUC Federal
Czech Rep. 0.0257 Chile 0.3106
Italy 0.0292 Venezuela 0.3265 Yes
Austria 0.0301 Yes Russia 0.3346 Yes
Romania 0.0592 Switzerland 0.3448 Yes
India 0.0747 Yes USA 0.3642 Yes
Japan 0.1224 Bolivia 0.3805
Poland 0.2029 Brazil 0.4039 Yes
S. Africa 0.2261 Yes Argentina 0.4852 Yes
Mexico 0.2300 Yes
Germany 0.2440 Yes
Spain 0.2853 Yes
Australia 0.2962 Yes
MEAN 0.2388
Source: Samuels and Snyder (2001) and own calculations. Higher values denote higher 
malapportionment.
10. This study uses the Loosemore-Hanby Index of Electoral Disproportionality (D), which 
takes the absolute value of the difference between each district’s seat and population 
shares. For a more complete explanation, see Samuels and Snyder (2001: 654-655). 153
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Does senate overrepresentation matter? In essence, cross-nation-
al evidence suggests that senate’s unequal representation of subna-
tional units shapes legislators’ strategies for pursuing distributive 
policy agendas. However obvious this argument may appear, a large 
part of the scholarly work on US legislative politics has downplayed 
the effect of senate apportionment on coalition building. For instance, 
Riker’s seminal notion of minimum-winning coalitions tells us more 
about the rules of the game than about asymmetries in the composi-
tion of winning coalitions. Drawing on this thesis, formal theory schol-
ars have not paid sufficient heed to the pervasive small-state advan-
tages in the distribution of federal funds (Atlas et al. 1995). Lee and 
Oppenheimer (in Lee, 2000: 59) provide a convincing explanation for 
this legislative outcome: “Apportionment shapes Senate distributive 
policy-making for two reasons. First, senators representing small states 
have more to gain from procuring a given amount of federal dollars 
than do senators who represent larger states. A federal grant of $5 
million, for example, has a far greater effect in Wyoming than in Cali-
fornia. Such a grant yields greater electoral benefits for senators who 
represent small states, both in terms of their statewide visibility and 
the percentage of residents benefited… Second, Senate apportion-
ment affects the incentives of coalition builders in distributive policy-
making. The tremendous differences in state population create a 
unique coalition-building dynamics: All senators’ votes are of equal 
value to the coalition builder, but they are not equal in price”.
As the statistics presented above succinctly suggest, senate malap-
portionment manifests itself in Argentina more than elsewhere. And 
its effects are highly axiomatic: virtually no policy coalition can be put 
together without the support of the regional structures of power of 
sparsely-populated and economically-underdeveloped provinces (Gor-
din, 2006). Alike Brazil, “strengthening the financial position” of small 
provinces affords incumbent national administrations significant po-
litical payoffs. Unlike Brazil, and taking aim with Mainwaring’s con-
tention, we argue that this “devil’s pact” does not lead to institu-
tional  decay.  On  the  contrary,  it  boosts  predictability  in  the 
intergovernmental rules of the game and, thus, makes “increasing 
returns processes” more sustainable.11 Such inducements, however, 
11. In a landmark essay, Pierson (2000) couched the notion of “political increasing returns” 
to underscore the strong status quo bias generally built into political institutions. 154
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create an equilibrium that poses acute problems to feedback proc-
esses and consequently foreclose policy reforms to temper the patron-
age-financed debt spending of Argentine provinces, particularly the 
small ones.
The combined effect of the scant policymaking powers of the 
Spanish Senate and its comparatively lower malapportionment levels, 
which render a more limited “opportunity structure” for small ACs to 
cajole federal transfers, helps to explain why, in contrast, subnational 
actors in Spain had to generate alternative means of action and rep-
resentation.12 As we will illustrate in the next section, the deficiencies 
of the Senate engendered a decisional vacuum to be filled by the 
creation of intergovernmental coordinating agencies like the CPPF 
and, to a lesser extent, the Conferencias Sectoriales, Sectoral Confer-
ences, which are multilateral forums where ACs exchange information 
with the national administration and among them. The weak institu-
tionalization of the senate and its lack of compensatory representa-
tional devices to redress inter-regional gaps have been counterbal-
anced by a gradual process of ongoing agreements that occurred 
especially in the 1992-1996 period (Leon, 2007). This open-endedness 
has imbued intergovernmental relations in Spain with a market-like 
character, where the fiscal accomplishments and steadfast regionalist 
leadership of ACs like Catalonia, Baleares, Navarra, and the Basque 
Country hindered even further any attempt of economically-periph-
eral ACs to offset their fiscal misfortunes through federal largesse. 
Above and beyond the fiscal revamping of the weak, formal institu-
tional vulnerability opened the door for policy innovation.13
3.  The Relational Role of Political Institutions:  
“The Rules of the Game” and Intergovernmental 
Instruments of Cooperation
Painting in broad strokes, we can say that Ellen Immergut 
provides a very satisfying explanation of institutional malleability, 
12. This institutionalist view of the Spanish Senate is matched by ordinary citizens’ percep-
tion of the role of this body in the politics of their country. In his study of public opinion 
in Spain, Lancaster (1997) shows that the senate is the least popular institution. 
13. For an analysis of policy innovation in Argentina, see Keech (1999).155
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which will be analytically applied to uncover differences between 
the Argentina’s predominantly stagnant regionalism and Spain’s 
drift to multilateral subnational collaboration. This contrast is the 
last building bloc in our explanation of the entrenchment of pa-
tronage-dependent provincial forces and fiscal decentralization 
stagnation in Argentina and Spain’s incremental progression to 
fiscal federalism.
In any political system, the adoption of a new policy deviating 
from the status quo (e.g. fiscal centralization) requires the agree-
ment of certain political actors. Leaving aside whether a larger 
number of such political actors is normatively desirable,14 policy 
change becomes more difficult when these actors proliferate. The 
necessity to decrease the number of such crucial actors is an issue 
that both “old” and “new” institutionalisms draw our attention to. 
From a state-society centered perspective, the notion of corporatism 
gives preferential treatment15 to state-sponsored societal organized 
interests, whereas neo-institutionalists (e.g. George Tsebelis) focus 
more compellingly on the institutional “black box” itself. Implicitly 
maintaining that these approaches are overly static or mechanistic, 
Immergut (1992) introduces the notion of “veto points”, which are 
basically areas of institutional vulnerability, namely, junctures in the 
policy process where opponents can frustrate policy change. Instead 
of seeing institutional representation as a rigid end point, the no-
tion of “veto points” suggests that “electoral rules and constitu-
tional structures provide the institutional ‘rules of the game’ in 
which subsequent political battles are fought” (Thelen and Steinmo, 
1992: 22). Moreover, this understanding of the policy-making proc-
ess is also consonant with our previous analysis insofar as the rela-
tive differences in policy-making powers of their respective senates 
and the presence or absence of institutional facilitators for disad-
vantaged subnational units in Argentina and Spain shape political 
interactions. Last, this approach is valuable to analyze countries that 
undergo institutional transformation like Spain and its ongoing 
process of federalization. Likewise, Argentina has recently experi-
14. While the modern literature in political science, with Lijphart (1999) as an exception, 
emphasizes the need of effective governance, there is no shortage of arguments on behalf 
of increasing the number of “veto players”, ranging from Baron de Montesquieu’s theory 
of separation of powers to John Stuart Mill’s praise of representative government.
15. Or, according to Schmitter (1974), exclusive.156
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ence profound institutional reforms such as the constitutional reform 
of 1994.16
3.1. Bilateral and “uninstitutionalized” Bargaining:  
The 1992 and 1993 Pactos Fiscales in Argentina
Imagine the following picture: Nearly 100 provincial representatives 
(governors, vice governors, provincial economy ministers and economic 
advisors) gather in a dreary building in Buenos Aires city. The raison d’être 
of this gathering is to persuade said representatives to forsake 15 percent 
of their respective provinces’ coparticipated tax revenues to overhaul 
the then moribund national social security system. Not far from this 
building, caravans of annoyed pensioners march forcefully into the Con-
gress amid threats of continuing their hunger strikes. Expectedly, and 
despite these representatives ostensible empathy with the cause of street 
demonstrators, no agreement can be hammered out.17
This chaotic background compounded the signature of the 1992 
Fiscal Pact at the headquarters of the Consejo Federal de Inversiones, 
CFI, Federal Investment Council.18 How can said provincial actors be 
persuaded to cut a deal that would make them less popular in their 
respective jurisdictions? First, the national government guaranteed 
provincial transfers of a minimum of US$ 725 per month. In order to 
make this arrangement even more “attractive”, Menem “sweetened” 
this unsettling gridlock through the creation of a special fund to fi-
nance fiscal disequilibria in the provinces, made up of revenues that 
would also be deducted from the automatic FTSA allocations. Accord-
ing to Eaton (2001: 110), “the amount that each province would receive 
from this fund was determined in one-to-one negotiations with the 
16. This constitutional reform includes: the abolition of the Electoral College and adoption 
of direct presidential elections, the possibility of re-election for incumbent presidents, 
political decentralization of the capital city (Buenos Aires) and, more relevant to our sub-
ject of study, the introduction of socio-demographic and economic variables, in lieu of 
fixed coefficients, in the determination of revenue-sharing. Interestingly, from said list of 
reforms, the latter is the only one that still did not materialize.
17. For a more complete account of these events, see Falletti (2000: 12).
18. Originally conceived as an inter-provincial consultative forum in regional development 
matters, the CFI has turned into a de facto branch of the Peronist Party, which typically 
controls a vast majority of governorships.157
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President. For example, the fact that the Radical governor of Chubut 
province offered early public support for the pact reflected Chubut’s 
position as one of the three provinces receiving the largest cut from 
the disequilibria fund… Provincial governors who initially criticized 
the pact but eventually signed it (such as Mario Moine of Entre Ríos) 
received a smaller cut, and provincial governors who refused to sign 
(such as Rolando Tauguinas of Chaco) received none of the special 
funds”. Furthermore, the inter-provincial apportionment of this fiscal 
disequilibria fund does not deviate from the pattern described in 
Chapter 3: Santa Cruz, Tierra del Fuego and Chubut (nearly 1.8 percent 
of total national population) received US$ 3 million each, whereas 
Córdoba and Santa Fé (nearly 18 percent of total population) only 
US$ 0.5 million each (Falletti, 2000: 12).
Encouraged by the apparent success of this deal, Menem arranged 
a second Fiscal Pact in August 1993. Unlike the previous pact, however, 
tax reform was the focus of this deal, enhancing its potential fiscally-
decentralizing impact. Nevertheless, the provinces did not rush to join 
this second pact because of its initial stipulation to abolish the provincial 
turnover tax (Schwartz and Liuskilla, 1997: 408). Expectedly, some maneu-
vers were necessary to cajole reluctant governors. First, the minimum 
amount set on 1992 was increased to US$ 745 million a month. Addition-
ally, political guarantees to negotiate the offsetting of claims and debts 
between the provinces and the central governments were put forward. 
These benefit packages, however, were only applicable to provinces that 
agreed to implement the terms of the pact. To avoid further “penalties”, 
Chaco’s governor this time chose to sign the pact, for which his province 
had its outstanding debts bailed out (Eaton, 2001: 111).19
In brief, we can argue that Argentine bilateralism is a manifesta-
tion of cost-shifting tactics for the provinces and divide-and-conquer 
for the center. The institutional “veto points” in the decision-making 
process interact with regional economic differentiation, leading to a 
fiscal policy output that amounts to an “iron law” of the political 
19. To illustrate how this exchange of political favors interweaves with institutional pre-
rogatives, Governor Tauguinas, who rules a relatively under-populated province, subse-
quently supported Menem’s campaign for the Constitutional Reform of 1994. It is note-
worthy that the assembly charged with rewriting the constitution was even more skewed 
than is representation in the senate. Buenos Aires province had one representative for 
every 109,000 citizens and Tierra del Fuego had one for every 6,000 (Sawers, 1996: 96).158
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economy of intergovernmental relations in Argentina: revenue cen-
tralization as a shielding mechanism for economically weak yet po-
litically powerful provinces.
3.2. Emerging Multilateral Bargaining: The spanish Consejo	
de	Política	Fiscal	y	Financiera	de	las	Comunidades	
Autónomas
The Spanish Council for Fiscal and Financing Policy of the AC 
(Consejo de Política Fiscal y Financiera de las Comunidades Autónomas, 
henceforth CPPF) was created in 1980 and is composed of the national 
Minister of Economy and Finance and his counterpart in each region, 
and the Minister of Public Administration. It acts as a consultative and 
discussion body, which concerns itself with the coordination of policy 
with particular regard to the distribution of national resources to the 
regions, public investment, the costs of services and public debt. This 
is the intergovernmental coordination body of highest importance 
(Huerta Carbonell, 1992: 215). The agreements reached within the CPFF, 
then, form the basis for developing the ACs financing arrangements.
The above having been said, there has been a tendency in the 
specialized literature to characterize the CPFF as merely symbolic, as a 
forum guided by a “hierarchical perception of intergovernmental rela-
tions, since the minister (i.e. the national Minister of Economy and Fi-
nance) calls the conference, chairs it and sets the agenda. This fosters 
the atmosphere of ‘institutional courtesy’ in the forum, as the ACs have 
only a very passive role in the discussions” (Grau i Creus, 2000: 63). 
Other scholars have ironically suggested that these meetings amount 
to cooperación por teléfono, cooperation by phone (Albertí Rovira, 
1991: 214). Further, Aja (1999: 227) claims that the CPPF is a mirror im-
age of party politics: When this forum recommended in 1993 the trans-
fer of the 15 percent of the general income taxes to all ACs, Galicia, 
which is a PP bastion, voted against it and even appealed to the Con-
stitutional Court. However, it voted in favor of a transfer of the 30 
percent of the same tax in 1996 carried out by Aznar’s administration.
It is precisely party politics what rendered opportunities to expand 
the role of CPPF and its modus operandum. While admitting that the 
afore-mentioned tactical behavior of Galicia is very telling, it is notice-
able that despite PSOE’s participation in the ruling coalitions in Nav-159
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arra, Aragon, and Asturias did not impede these ACs to support the 
PP- sponsored 30 percentage reform. Moreover, regionalist party of-
ficials, by and large from Catalonia and the Basque Country, advocated 
deepening revenue decentralization on efficiency as well as on nation-
alist grounds. For that purpose, they encouraged the formation of 
mixed technical commission of autonomic and national officials known 
as Comisiones Mixtas, Mixed Commisions, whose multilateral character 
was somewhat daunting for more transfer-dependent ACs (Ramallo 
Massanet and Zornoza Pérez, 2000). Nonetheless, regionalist party rep-
resentatives from poorer ACs had a very hard time in articulating re-
gional assertiveness amid hostility to fiscal decentralization moves, so 
that they gradually moved closer to their more nationalistically-mind-
ed counterparts (Gordin, 2009). Exogenous factors such as Europeaniza-
tion played a role, insofar as regions were endowed with significant 
resources, including know-how applicable to the sometimes highly 
technical content of discussions held in the Sectorial Commissions.20
Further, it is important to point out that bilateral agreements were 
central in addressing the claims of “historic communities” such as the 
Basque Country and Navarra, but that the balance between bilateral 
and multilateral agreements has gradually shifted to an ascendancy of 
the latter (Ruiz Almendral, 2003: 45). In fact, the asymmetric system 
derived from the special regime that exists for the afore-mentioned 
foral AC has not precluded more general agreements at the general 
level. Likewise, while some authors emphasize the negative externalities 
of bilateralism in terms of the politicisation of the fiscal regime (Leon 
Alfonso, 2007), others lay emphasis on the uniform budgetary restric-
tions shared by all autonomic jurisdictions, which ultimately make fiscal 
decentralization in Spain more sustainable (Caballero, 2003).
In conclusion, in contrast with the cost-sharing strategy of Ar-
gentine provinces, Spanish ACs opted to increase collaborative patterns 
20. We disagree, however, with monocausal explanations based on EU influences such as 
Tanja Börzel’s approach. She claims that “while the extension of multilateral intergovern-
mental cooperation may reflect a certain consolidation of Spanish intergovernmental rela-
tions, the functioning of the 16 Euro-effective conferences confirms that the major proposi-
tion of this study that multilateral cooperation is the response to Europeanization rather 
than the result of the consolidation of the State of the Autonomies” (Börzel, 2002: 146-47). 
In addition to supranational-level influences, scholarly discussions about the future of de-
centralization in Spain were deeply influenced by the German experience and concepts such 
Bundestreue (federal loyalty) are oftentimes made reference to (Aja, 1999: 142-43).160
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in policy-making, in which representatives of the different levels ne-
gotiate their major differences at the program design and implemen-
tation stages. Unlike Argentina, the increasing pivotal role played by 
regionalist parties in national formal and informal fora played a more 
critical role than the encapsulation of unequal territorial representa-
tion at the legislative level. Albeit not entirely stress-free, as some 
peripheral ACs resisted the pace and nature of reforms, fiscal decen-
tralization in Spain expanded to levels comparable to those of Ger-
many and closer to Switzerland.
4.  Final Remarks
The findings of this paper have implications both for the politi-
cal science literature on comparative federalism and for the literature 
on fiscal decentralization in these and other countries. Given research 
trends in the former literature, some of our findings are surprising. 
The concept of institutional vulnerability, a byproduct of “veto points” 
theory, appears to be more useful in explaining the stochastic nature 
of fiscal decentralization policies than notions of institutional embed-
dedness. More than the formal rules per se, the interaction between 
institutional structures (e.g. the senate) and political hurdles gives rise 
to the “rules of the game”. Put simply, over-represented territories 
yield political payoffs that afford them “immunity” to revenue de-
centralization imperatives. In this vein, the “veto points” framework 
involves different opportunities for influencing political decisions.
In assessing how the politics of fiscal decentralization varies in 
Argentina and Spain, we are able to conclude that institutional “over-
development” and the ensuing “locking-in” of a lopsided connection 
between territorial overrepresentation and the non-proportional 
distribution of public funds in the Argentina propitiates the mainte-
nance of a fiscally-ineffective but politically-desired status quo. There-
fore, formal federal polities, which are normally based on strong 
bicameralism, can at times be less effective than more loose, yet de-
centralizing unitary systems in deepening fiscal decentralization. And 
we are also able to conclude that institutional malleability and open-
endedness rendered opportunities to regionally-assertive entrepre-
neurs for claiming further competences, including revenue collection 
and administration. The policy of transferring revenue and revenue 
authority to subnational governments, then, can be sabotaged or 161
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advanced depending on the institutional incentives and capabilities 
of political actors.
This study suggests then that the presence of formal governmen-
tal structures for representing territorial interests does not necessarily 
mean they are effective in practice. A highly “institutionalised” senate 
in Argentina shields the political and economic interests of poorly-
developed, yet politically powerful, provinces. As these provinces are 
coopted in the legislative process at a more “convenient” price than 
metropolitan regions, regional asymmetries in the allocation fiscal 
authorities are sustained over time. A far less “institutionalised” cham-
ber of territorial representation and a more malleable and open-end-
ed institutional configuration in Spain prevents backward regions to 
exploit institutional devices to block fiscal decentralization. What is 
mote, this institutional malleability has facilitated the emergence of 
alternative policy-making mechanisms where multilateral subnational 
coordination is facilitated and fiscal decentralization further expanded. 
Therefore, formal federal polities, which are normally based on strong 
bicameralism, can at times be less effective than more loose, yet de-
centralizing unitary systems in deepening fiscal decentralization. This 
scenario complicates the validity of held views about the positive as-
sociation between political federalism and fiscal decentralization.
Further, our overall argument implies that when the sorting out 
of subnational fiscal relations takes place in malapportioned legisla-
tive institutions we could see a mutually reinforcing relationship be-
tween decentralization and regionalized patronage, as transpires from 
the Argentine experience. That is, the policy of transferring revenue 
and revenue authority to subnational governments not only renders 
possible the entrenchment of patronage-ridden regional enclaves but, 
also, the latter can exploit institutional and political opportunities to 
sabotage fiscal decentralization projects.
In this regard, it is noteworthy that the same institutional prob-
lems that preclude the advancement of fiscal decentralization are also 
associated with national fiscal crises. Argentina, a country whose pol-
icies of economic adjustment in the early 1990s have won it interna-
tional acclaim, has proved unable to restructure its federal system to 
address severe imbalances in the intergovernmental fiscal relations. 
The overall unsustainable level of subnational debt and the limiting 
authority of the center to rein in fiscal discipline lurked underneath 162
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Argentina´s foreign debt default – the world´s largest – and the pre-
mature fall of De La Rua´s elected government in December 2001. 
Federalism and its concomitant institutional protection of the au-
tonomy of subnational units can at times have perverse effects on 
macroeconomic performance. Despite federalism´s ostensible “market-
preserving” quality (Weingast, 1995), deadlocked and malfunctioning 
federal institutions can lead to economic catastrophes.
In closing, this understanding of fiscal decentralization also 
speaks to a body of scholarship on fiscal federalism that focuses on 
incentives and goals (e.g. rent-seeking, fiscal performance) without 
explicitly and systematically identifying the political framework in 
which fiscal decentralization decisions are taken. Borrowing from a 
recent and enlightening study of federalism by Filippov, Ordeshook 
and Shvetsova (2004: 138), “fiscal allocations are biased toward certain 
states or groups of states almost everywhere, because the ability to 
cater to particular local needs is an essential characteristic and advan-
tage of the federal form”.
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ABsTRACT
This paper suggests a putative paradox of federalism, namely that formal 
federal polities, which are normally based on strong bicameralism, can at times 
be less effective than more loose, yet decentralizing unitary systems in deepen-
ing fiscal decentralization. For that purpose, case studies of Argentina and 
Spain are used to provide insights into the way that the distribution of insti-
tutional resources in multi-tiered polities shapes the extent to which the pol-
icy of transferring revenue to subnational governments can be exploited for 
political gain. It does so by using institutional analysis and qualitative evidence 
to assess the effect of patterns of territorial representation on fiscal decen-
tralization policies. It focuses first on legislative-level territorial representation 
and its effect on intergovernmental fiscal outcomes. Also, it explores the con-
ditions leading to bilateral and multilateral intergovernmental bargaining, 
which, we will argue are part and parcel of the tension between territorial 
distribution of political influence and economic resources. The research sug-
gests that whereas Argentine subnational interests are “locked-in” at the Sen-
ate level and intergovernmental negotiations are conducted bilaterally, open-
ended institutional arrangements and a relatively impotent senate in Spain 
boosted the redressing of regional concerns through informal intergovern-
mental fora and increasing multilateral collaboration. Such differences in pat-
terns of institutional representation and bargaining strategies account for the 
paucity of fiscal decentralization in Argentina and its relative progress in Spain.
Key words: Federalism; Fiscal Decentralization; Legislative Malapportionment; 
Argentina; Spain.
REsuM
Aquest article suggereix una paradoxa putativa del federalisme. Les organit-
zacions polítiques federals, que normalment es basen en un bicameralisme 
fort, de vegades poden ser menys efectives que els sistemes unitaris més des-
organitzats i descentralitzats en l’aprofundiment de la descentralització fiscal. 
Així doncs, els estudis de cas d’Argentina i Espanya serveixen per proporcionar 
coneixements sobre la manera com la distribució dels recursos institucionals 
en organitzacions polítiques de diversos nivells dóna forma a la mesura en què 
la política de transferència d’ingressos als governs subnacionals pot ser explo-
tada amb finalitats polítiques. I es fa mitjançant l’anàlisi institucional i l’evidència 
qualitativa per avaluar l’efecte dels patrons de representació territorial a les 
polítiques de descentralització fiscal. Primerament, se centra en la represen-
tació territorial en l’àmbit legislatiu i en el seu efecte en els resultats fiscals 
intergovernamentals. Així mateix, explora les condicions que porten a la ne-
gociació intergovernamental bilateral i multilateral, que, tal com discutirem, 
són part integrant de la tensió entre la distribució territorial d’influència po-168
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lítica i els recursos econòmics. La recerca suggereix que els interessos subna-
cionals d’Argentina es troben “congelats” en l’àmbit del Senat i que les nego-
ciacions intergovernamentals es duran a terme de manera bilateral. En canvi, 
els acords institucionals de composició oberta i un senat relativament impotent 
a Espanya han impulsat la reparació dels interessos regionals gràcies als fòrums 
intergovernamentals informals i a l’augment de la col·laboració multilateral. 
Aquestes diferències en els patrons de representació institucional i en les es-
tratègies de negociació donen compte de l’escassetat de la descentralització 
fiscal a l’Argentina i del seu progrés relatiu a Espanya.
Paraules clau: federalisme; descentralització fiscal; distribució legislativa des-
igual; Argentina; Espanya.
REsuMEn
Este artículo sugiere una paradoja putativa del federalismo. En otras palabras, 
las organizaciones políticas federales, que normalmente se apoyan en un bica-
meralismo fuerte, a veces pueden ser menos efectivas que los sistemas unitarios 
más desorganizados y descentralizados en la profundización de la descentrali-
zación fiscal. A tal efecto, los estudios de caso de Argentina y España se utilizan 
para proporcionar conocimientos sobre la manera como la distribución de los 
recursos institucionales en organizaciones políticas de varios niveles da forma a 
la medida en la que la política de transferencia de ingresos a los gobiernos 
subnacionales puede ser explotada con fines políticos. Y se hace mediante el 
análisis institucional y la evidencia cualitativa para evaluar el efecto de los pa-
trones de representación territorial en las políticas de descentralización fiscal. 
En primer lugar, se centra en la representación territorial en el ámbito legislati-
vo y en su efecto en los resultados fiscales intergubernamentales. Asimismo, 
explora las condiciones que llevan a la negociación intergubernamental bilate-
ral y multilateral, que, tal y como vamos a discutir, son parte integrante de la 
tensión entre la distribución territorial de influencia política y los recursos eco-
nómicos. La investigación sugiere que los intereses subnacionales de Argentina 
se encuentran “congelados” en el ámbito del Senado y que las negociaciones 
intergubernamentales se llevarán a cabo de manera bilateral. En cambio, los 
acuerdos institucionales de composición abierta y un senado relativamente im-
potente en España han impulsado la reparación de los intereses regionales 
gracias a los foros intergubernamentales informales y al aumento de la colabo-
ración multilateral. Estas diferencias en los patrones de representación institu-
cional y en las estrategias de negociación dan cuenta de la escasez de la descen-
tralización fiscal en Argentina y de su progreso relativo en España.
Palabras clave: federalismo; descentralización fiscal; distribución legislativa 
desigual; Argentina; España.